Professor Downie's attempt, in his admirably clear and concise paper, to define 'torture' is the best that I have seen so far; but it is necessary to ask what purpose such definitions serve. Some may feel that verbal questions of this kind ought not to occupy our time. But whatever conclusions we reach will have to be expressed in words, and if the words have not been made clear, the conclusions will not be. For example, if we say that torture, or torture in certain specified circumstances, ought to be ruled out, it has to be clear precisely what we are saying should be ruled out. Downie says (page 135) ' From a practical point of view it does not really matter very much whether a practice is strictly torture or some other form of inhuman treatment; the point would be to get it stopped'. But Kant. On the Kantian side, Downie rightly includes in his definition of torture (page 136) 'using that being as a means to an end to which the being has not consented'. This echoes Kant's dictum 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (1). Kant explains on the next page that others 'ought always at the same time to be rated as ends, that is, only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action'; and he goes on to say 'For the ends of a subject who is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends' (2) .
Take now the case of the terrorist who has put a bomb in a litter bin in a crowded place. Is I have argued elsewhere (5) that the right rule for police to adopt would be to rule out torture absolutely. The reason is that once it is even contemplated, it will be used, and spread, and the end result will be much worse than the evils that torture was supposed to counter. This is consistent with admitting that cases are conceivable in which torture would be the right course; I gave a highly improbable example in the place cited. In the world as it is, it never will be the right course. Therefore policemen should not even contemplate it; and the same is even more true of doctors.
However, in regimes where, in spite of this, torture is practised by the police, difficult situations can arise where doctors get involved willy nilly. They may find themselves confronted with a prisoner whom they might help medically, and then it is difficult to draw the line between helping the prisoner and helping the regime. For example, ifhe is patched up, it may be only to be subjected to further torture. Downie misses this point when he says 'Of course, if it could be established that no one should ever be involved in torture then it would follow that doctors should not -the greater set would contain the lesser' (page 136). In a regime where torture is practised, a doctor might not be able to avoid being involved in various ways. But he will normally be able to control the extent and the kind of involvement. Doctors living under such regimes will be wise, therefore, to make for themselves some firm rules which they do not depart from, and if possible get them adopted by the governing bodies of their profession. What these rules should be needs further discussion, and has received it. They would probably include a rule not to treat torture victims until they are free, distasteful as this policy may be; for otherwise the doctor will become an ancillary to further torture. And they will certainly include a rule to give only such treatment as is for the good of the victim. However, those with practical experience are better able to suggest and assess such rules than I am.
The main point is that even a utilitarian like me (perhaps especially a utilitarian like me), if he thinks the matter through and looks at the consequences of the adoption or abandonment of such firm rules, will recommend that doctors find the best ones 
